The Building of the US Missile Shield in Europe: The Triangular Relationship: US, EU, Russia. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 11, No. 8, June 2011 by Larivé, Maxime
 
   
   
   
                                                                                    R. Schuman 
 
 
 
Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence 
 
 
The Building of the US Missile Shield in Europe 
The triangular relationship: US, EU, Russia 
 
 
 
  Maxime Larivé 
   
 
                     
   
   Vol. 11, No. 8    
June 2011 
   
 
Published with the support of the EU Commission. 2 
 
EUMA 
European Union Miami Analysis (EUMA), Special Series, is a service of analytical essays on 
current, trend setting issues and developing news about the European Union. 
 
These papers are produced by the Jean Monnet Chair, in cooperation with the Miami-Florida 
European Union Center of Excellence (a partnership of the University of Miami and Florida 
International  University)  as  an  outreach  service  for  the  academic,  business  and  diplomatic 
communities. 
 
Among the topics to be included in the series, the following are suggested: 
 
  The collapse of the Constitution and its rescue 
  Turkey: prospects of membership 
  Immigration crisis and cultural challenges 
  Security threats and responses 
  The EU and Latin America 
  The EU as a model and reference in the world 
  The Common Agricultural Policy and other public subsidies  
  The euro and the dollar 
  EU image in the United States 
 
These topics form part of the pressing agenda of the EU and represent the multifaceted and 
complex nature of the European integration process.  These papers also seek to highlight the 
internal and external dynamics which influence the workings of the EU and its relationship with 
the rest the world. 
 
Miami - Florida European Union Center                                Jean Monnet Chair Staff 
 
University of Miami                     Joaquín Roy (Director) 
1000 Memorial Drive                     Astrid Boening (Associate Director) 
101 Ferré Building                                 María Lorca (Associate Editor)   
Coral Gables, FL 33124-2231                                           Maxime Larivé (Research Assistant)                           
Phone:  305-284-3266                                            
Fax: (305) 284 4406 
Web: www.miami.edu/eucenter                                                Florida International University 
                                                                                                   Rebecca Friedman (FIU, Co Director)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                       
Inter-American Jean Monnet Chair Editorial Board: 
Carlos Hakansson, Universidad de Piura, Perú 
Finn Laursen, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada 
Michel Levi-Coral, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Quito, Ecuador 
José Luis Martínez-Estay¸ Universidad de los Andes, Santiago de Chile, Chile 
Félix Peña, Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, Buenos Aires, Argentina 
Stephan Sberro, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
Eric Tremolada, Universidad del Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia 
 
International Jean Monnet Chair Editorial Advisors: 
Francesc Granell, University of Barcelona, Spain 
Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, Vilnius University, Lithuania 3 
 
The Building of the US Missile Shield in Europe during the Bush Era. 
The triangular relationship: US, EU, Russia 
 
 
Maxime Larivé
 
 
Introduction  
 
It  all  started  at  the  end  of  World War two  when the  United  States  under  President Truman 
decided to use nuclear power against Japan in order to end the conflict. Since then, the race for 
nuclear weapons has never ceased. Russia became the second nuclear power in 1949, followed by 
the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), China (1964), India (1974) and Pakistan (1998). 
During Reagan‟s presidency from 1981 to 1989, President Reagan initiated a nuclear missile 
shield  project  programmed  to  protect  the  US  from  any  sort  of  Russian  nuclear  attack.  This 
program has been called the „Star Wars‟ project and is a symbol of the Cold War era. Since the 
beginning  of  the  1990s,  the  project  has  lost  some  of  its  strengths,  as  it  was  not  considered 
anymore as a core instrument to ensure US security. However, the events of September 11, 2001 
changed the US perceptions of threat. Since then, the Bush administration, along with the „war on 
terror,‟ had revitalized the „Star Wars‟ project. Vast amount of money have been spent, and 
missiles silos have been built in California, Alaska, the UK, and Greenland. But the problem 
became international as soon as the US decided to finance the building of two pieces of the 
missile  shield  puzzle:  a  missile  interceptor  site  in  Poland  and  a  X-band  radar  in  the  Czech 
Republic. Both states are NATO members and joined the European Union in 2004. 
Such military constructions sponsored by the US on the European continent, more especially 
former states under soviet influence and new EU Member States, created interference  in the 
European  balance  of  power.  On  one  side,  Russia,  which  was  recovering  economically  and 
internationally, had tried under the Presidencies of Vladimir Putin to reinstitute its influence 
through the use of neo-imperial foreign policy over its „lost territories.‟ On the other side, the 
European Union, which saw its largest wave of enlargement in 2004 composed essentially of 
Newly Independent States (NIS), was evolving into unknown waters. The EU had been working 
on the integration process of these NIS, but also on developing a common external policy. In 
addition, the interactions between the EU and Russia have turned out to be tense and blurry since 
2000, when Vladimir Putin ascended to the Russian presidency. The EU has been seeking to 
enforce democracy and the rule of law in Russia, whereas, Moscow saw its future through the 
lens of a more authoritarian regime, or a „managed democracy.‟ On top of this, Washington was 
planning the construction of part of its missile shield in Poland and Czech Republic in order to 
protect its „allies‟ and its territory from a potential nuclear attack orchestrated by Tehran. 
So we can see emerging tensions in the triangular relationship (US-Russia-EU) around the 
case of the missile shield. In order to study such a topic, several questions need to be raised: What 
statement was the US making towards the EU, Russia, and the world? Was the missile shield 
program really built in order to tackle any nuclear attack launched by Iran or another „rogue 
state‟? Did this „crisis‟ represent an alarm or an opportunity for the EU to master its own military 
and security destiny? What were the perceptions of individual EU Member States regarding the 
missile shield program?  
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Historical and Political Background  
 
The  US  desires  to  possess  a  missile  defense  system  appeared  in  the  1950s,  right  after  the 
possession of nuclear bombs by other states. “An early example of missile defense was the US 
Safeguard system (1969-1976) built to protect the Minutemen silos housing US intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBM). At the same time, the Soviet Union deployed its own system, Galosh, 
to protect Moscow and its surroundings from incoming ballistic missiles” (Lindstrom 2008, 1). 
But, the actual missile defense system, so-called „Star War‟ project, was initiated under President 
Ronald Reagan 25 years ago, when he launched the creation of an integrated Ballistic Missile 
Defense  System  (BMDS).  The  goals  were  to  “develop  anti-ballistic  missile  technologies  to 
improve our [American] national security and lessen our reliance on nuclear deterrence” (Missile 
Defense Agency 2007a, 1). Since the 1980s, the US has spent over $110 billion in the system of 
national missile defense. 
When President George W. Bush arrived in office in 2000, he made the ballistic missile 
defense deployment system a national security objective for the future. “The Bush Administration 
substantially  increased  the  funding  for  missile  defense  programs  and  laid  the  foundation  for 
withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty” (Hildreth 2007, 5). The argument was that Russia was 
not a threat anymore to the US, and that the new threats came instead from the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iran, North Korea and Iraq were 
identified  as  potential  enemies  seeking  for  nuclear  power.  Soon  after,  the  US  started  the 
construction of missile silos and radars in Alaska and California, but also overseas, in Greenland 
and the United Kingdom. Then, the Bush Administration in 2002 scrapped the 1972 ABM treaty 
in  order  to  “deploy  the  re-named  Ground  Based  Midcourse  Defense  System”  (US  Congress 
2007c, 5).  
According to the Bush administration, the most imminent threat came from Iran and North 
Korea. Since the arrival of conservative leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the US concerns considerably increased due to the assumptions that 
Tehran was seeking for military and civilian nuclear power. Even though in November 2007, the 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was able to demonstrate “with high confidence that in fall 
2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge with confident that the halt lasted at 
least several years. […] Assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear 
weapons program as of mid-2007” (National Intelligence Estimate 2007). Even with evidence 
brought  by  the  NIE,  the  Bush  administration  believed  that  Tehran  was  still  working  on 
developing nuclear weapons. The second potential danger came from North Korea. In October 
2007, the White House announced that, “America faces a growing ballistic missile threat. In 1972 
just nine countries had ballistic missiles. Today, that number has grown to 27 and it includes 
hostile regimes ties to terrorists” (Coyle and Samson 2008, 3). Washington judges the increased 
of ICBMs number around the world represent a direct menace to the security of the US and its 
allies.  
In  order  to  answer  the  Iranian  threat,  the  US  had  been  dealing  bilaterally  with  the 
governments of the Czech Republic and Poland with the intention of developing and building 
parts of the missile shield in their territories. “The proposed European deployment, is also called 
the „third site‟ because it would be the third deployment after the interceptors in Alaska and 
California” (Coyle and Samson 2008). The European site would be a Ground-Based Midcourse 
Defense (GMD) system, which was only a piece of the puzzle. “What the US has proposed for 
Europe is part of an overall ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) that would, it is claimed 
eventually defend against all ranges of ballistic missiles during all stages of their flights” (Coyle 
and Samson 2008). The large picture of the system included satellites, airplanes, terrestrial and 
naval radars, silos and so on. But so far the offer made by the US to the Czech Republic was a 
powerful X-band radar placed at 90 km southwest of Prague. It was a Midcourse radar, meaning 5 
 
that its role is to detect short- and mid-range ballistic missiles.
1 The second agreement had been 
made with Poland, which would host ten missiles defense interceptors. These are ground-based 
interceptors, almost identical to the ones in California and Alaska. “As with the interceptors based 
in Alaska and California, these interceptors are designed only for defensive purposes and employ 
small hit-to-kill vehicles instead of explosives to destroy their targets at collision speeds in excess 
of 7 km per second and at more than 200 km above the earth‟s surface” (Missile Defense Agency 
2007b, 3).
2 According to Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of European 
and Eurasians Affairs, there was no offense ice capability in the US plan.
3 The deployment of the 
silos would begin in 2011 and be done by 2013.  
The installation of radars and missile interceptors inscribed itself in the logic that the US is a 
„European power.‟ Europe represents a platform in direction of the Middle East, the Black Sea, 
and Asia (Mongrenier 2007, 3).
4 The missile system  in Europe needed to be built in order to 
protect the others US radar systems. Philip Coyle explains, “the MDA sees the proposed missile 
defenses in Europe as a first line of defense to protect existing radar sites in Greenland and the 
United Kingdom necessary to defend the US, not first and foremost to defend Europe” (2008a, 
14). As summarized by Gustav Lindstrom, the construction of the European GMD was necessary 
for  three  reasons:  first,  for  the  protection  from  missiles  launched  by  rogue  states;  second, 
protection from the possibility that a non-state actors could possess a warhead; and third, for fear 
of an accidental missile launch (2008, 1). 
The last point that needs to be highlighted concerns the US legitimacy over the European 
GMD.  According  to  the  document  released  by  the  Missile  Defense  Agency/Department  of 
Defense (MDA/DoD), the missile shield in Europe as to be understood along these lines:  
“In  our  [DoD  and  US  government]  comprehensive  strategy  to  combat 
weapons of mass destruction, missile defense is just one element of a multi-
faceted approach, which includes diplomacy, export controls, threat reduction 
assistance, nonproliferation regimes, and counter-proliferation programs. At the 
same  time,  missile  defense  is  our  ultimate  insurance  policy  if  these  other 
elements of our strategy fail. History has taught us that, despite our best effort, 
the free  world  will  be challenged  by  military  surprises  as  well as failures  in 
diplomacy, intelligence, and deterrence” (Missile Defense Agency 2007b, 1).  
 
This statement is in the pure realist and unilateralist tradition of Washington. The major 
criticism is that the MDA does not incorporate multilateralism as a mean and tool for national and 
international security. But its rhetoric swims in the blend of offensive and defensive realism. In 
the current world system, the use of hard power is not enough. The US needs to increase its 
                                                 
1 According to the MDA, “this X–band radar will be optimized to point its narrow beam at Iranian 
ballistic missile threats in flight. This is not a surveillance radar […], but instead uses information from 
early warning satellites and other transportable sea- and land-based sensors to pinpoint or „cue‟ its very thin 
beam to find and track ballistic missiles after they are launched” (Missile Defense Agency 2007b, 4). 
2 “The European GBI (ground-based interceptors) will consist of two rocket stages in contrast to the 
three state GBI deployed today [in Alaska and California]”  (Hildreth and Ek 2007, 3). 
3 “The interceptors carry no explosive warhead of any type, but rely instead on their kinetic energy to 
collide with and destroy incoming warheads” (US Congress 2007c, 7). 
4  According  to  the  MDA,  “ballistic  missile  defense  is  one  of  the  most  complex  and  challenging 
missions in the Department of Defense. A ballistic missile‟s altitude, speed, and range leave a defender 
little time to react. To meet this challenge, the Missile Defense Agency is developing a layered, integrated 
system capable of destroying a ballistic missile in each of three distinct phases of flight – boost, midcourse, 
and  terminal”  (Missile  Defense  Agency  2007a,  1).  Thus,  “the  system  requires  accurate  missile 
identification  and  tracking  with  advanced  sensors;  advanced  interceptor  missiles  or  directed  energy 
weapons  (e.g.,  lasers);  and  reliable  Command  and  Control,  Battle  Management,  and  Communications 
(C2BMC) to integrate the system and direct the engagement” (Missile Defense Agency 2007a, 1). As 
proved by Philip Coyle, the GMD is the most complex of the systems and the most costly (2008a, 3). 
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cooperation not only with Poland and the Czech Republic, but also with the EU as a whole. As 
argued by Secretary of State Ms. Clinton, the US should instead use „smart power‟ which is a 
combination of the use of hard and soft power. By dealing unilaterally and bilaterally, the US 
might increase its security in the short term, but not in the long run. As per Christopher Layne, 
the US cannot go alone anymore, but should implement an offshore balancing grand strategy 
instead of behaving as a hegemon. He argues that America is seeking to maintain its hegemony 
through an expansionist policy overstretching its power (Layne 2006). This statement can be 
completed by the MDA, which considers that “trans-Atlantic security is indivisible.” If Europe is 
not secure, the US is not. The US must develop such program in Europe to protect Europe and 
itself  “before  a  threat  fully  emerge”  (Missile  Defense  Agency  2007b,  1).  In  addition,  as 
demonstrated by Layne, the US desire to enforce its security overseas from rogue states, such as 
Iran or North Korea, is creating tensions with its European allies and might even ignite a new 
Cold War with Russia. On this specific matter, the question that appears is: is it worth it for the 
US to behave as a hegemon, believe in a system that is not working, and weaken its relations with 
its allies in order to comfort its „peace of illusions‟?  
 
 
The impact of the Iranian menace on the European balance of power  
 
The Iranian threat 
 
According to President W. Bush, the US included Iran as a state figuring in the list of the „axis of 
evil‟ along with Iraq and North Korea. Such categorization makes of Iran an international threat, 
and more precisely a military menace to American and world security. 
On November 2
nd, 2006, Iran launched several short-range rockets and short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles during the “Great Prophet II” exercise (Missile Defense Agency 2007b, 
2). The concerns emerged after the successful launch of the Shahab-3 missile, which has a range 
of  1300  km.  In  order  to  manufacture  the  Shahab-3  missile,  the  Iranian  missile  development 
program had received assistance from Russia, China and North Korea. The Shahab-3 missile is 
based on the North Korean technology of the No Dong missile. Iranian authority declared that the 
Shahab-3 could have a range of up to 2000 km, which could ultimately threaten parts of central 
Europe, Turkey, Israel, and all the Persian Gulf (Missile Defense Agency 2007b, 2). By 2015, 
according to US intelligence services, Iran could possess ICBMs capable of reaching the US. 
Even though, the NIE stated, in its report published in 2007, that “in Fall 2003, Tehran halted 
its nuclear weapons program,‟ but the Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons 
at some point” (Hildreth and Ek 2008, 2), the Bush Administration maintained its position and 
considered Iran as threat and believed that Tehran was seeking nuclear power and capabilities. 
 
The European balance of power 
 
The creation of the GMD in two NIS added up to the list of tensions between the US and Russia, 
and the West and Russia such as: the recent events on the project of NATO enlargement  – 
concerning the possible inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine as permanent members –; the Western 
critics over the region of South Caucasus and Moldavia; the question around the independence of 
Kosovo; the US  military actions in the Middle East; the western criticisms over the lack of 
democratization in the Russian political system; and so forth. In the meantime since the arrival of 
Vladimir Putin at the Russian presidency, Russia had been regaining its lost power and admitting 
the  failure  of  the  past.  President  Putin  had  been following  a  foreign  policy  based  on  realist 
principal:  increase  of  Russian  military  power,  use  of  military  threat  in  order  to  enforce  its 
security, influence, use of energy as a weapon, and unilateral behavior. President Putin tried to 
put himself as a leader challenging the supremacy of the West, and especially the supremacy of 
the Euro-Atlantic community. Such foreign policy and behavior have been possible thanks to 7 
 
Russian hydrocarbons resources as energy – mainly gas – has been used as a weapon by Moscow 
in order to fortify its authority, legitimacy, and autonomy at the regional level. 
With the announcement of the agreement between Czech Republic and Poland with the US 
on the construction of the GMD, Russia had been reestablishing a climate of instability in Europe 
and internationally. Moscow reacted along two lines: first, in June 2007, Putin threatened to point 
nuclear missiles at major European cities if the US plans to position missile defense bases in 
Poland and Czech Republic. “It is obvious” Putin said, “if part of strategic nuclear potential of the 
US is located in Europe and will be threatening us, we will have to respond” (Applebaum 2007). 
And  second,  Russia  threatened  to  suspend  its  adherence  to  the  CFE  (Conventional  Force  in 
Europe) Treaty, but also talked of leaving several treaties such as the INF (Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear  Force)  and  START  I  (which  expired  in  2009).  Ultimately  the  GMD  could  have 
considerable consequences on the future of international law and military treaties. Furthermore, 
one of the most alarming issues concerned the Outer Space Treaty (article III-IV) calling for a 
peaceful use of space. Because of the GMD, we could see a race in the militarization of space, 
which already started back in 2007 when the Chinese tore down one of their satellites. 
To conclude, even before the construction of the GMD, the regional balance of power was 
progressively shifting in Europe. If the current balance of power happened to be disrupted, one 
could argue that the level of insecurity and instability between peaceful states could increase 
significantly. The question that arose: was the GMD a source of security or instability? 
 
Why Poland and Czech Republic? 
 
One of the last questions is why did the US decide to collaborate with Poland and the Czech 
Republic? Why not, Turkey, Ukraine or Bulgaria? There exists many explanations, but the most 
common one can be divided in three categories. First, in Poland, there was a sense that the US 
had been historically a reliable ally, and that such system would deepen the existing relationship 
with the US. The second scenario was that “some Czechs and Poles believe that the missile 
defense  sites  would  become  a  prestigious  symbol  of  the  two  countries‟  enhanced  role  in 
defending Europe” (Hildreth and Ek 2007, 6). And, last scenario was that Poles and Czechs saw it 
as the ultimate security/guarantee against an eventual Russian attack. 
Unfortunately, by making such decisions, Poland and the Czech Republic were distancing 
themselves with the „old‟ Europe, which saw it as a non-compliance with the general European 
road of integration. In the case of Poland, it was safe to admit that a division on the issue existed 
domestically between the political class and public opinion. On one side, Poland needed to satisfy 
nationalist polish party and movements in order to maintain a certain political cohesion, which 
pushed itself closer to the US. And on the other side, according to Eurobarometer, Poles were 
very attached to the European ideal. Poland was facing a real dilemma. In addition, as stated by 
Paul Geremeck, former foreign minister of Poland, two motivations needed to be addressed in 
order to justify Polish policies towards the EU and the US. First, the process of Polish integration 
within the EU took time. In 1989, after the fall of the Berlin wall, Poles believed that they would 
immediately be welcomed by the EU, when in reality, it was not until 2004 that Poland became 
an EU Member State. And even during the process of integration in 2004, the excitement was 
asymmetrical: on one side, the EU was indifferent to polish integration; while on the other Poland 
was „hysterical.‟ The second aspect concerned the US. In 1999, the US integrated Poland inside 
NATO. Such move from the US changed everything, because it strengthened the existing links of 
the Cold War with the US. As of today, the EU has been paying the price of this political move 
made by Washington (Schlosser 2008). Paul Geremeck added that Poland was a large buyer of 
security. The EU did not have yet a clear defense and security policy, which gave an advantage to 
the US. Since 2000, with the arrival of Putin at the presidency, Poland and the Czech Republic 
have felt threatened by the neo-imperialist ambitions of Moscow, and were desperately looking 
for security and protection. 
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The need for the missile shield? 
 
Philip Coyle explained that during the Reagan administration, Paul Nitze, former special adviser 
to the President, laid down a series of criteria in order to start the construction of the missile 
shield program, which read, “1. The system should be effective; 2. Be able to survive against 
direct attack; and 3. Be cost effective at the margin – that is, be less to increase your defense than 
it is for your opponent to increase their offense against it” (Coyle 2008a, 6). Later on, President 
Clinton developed his own criteria before deciding on such a program, which were: “1. Whether 
the threat is materializing; 2. The status of the technology based on an initial series of rigorous 
flight tests; 3. Whether the system is affordable; 4. The implications that going forward with 
National Missile Defense (NMD) [or GMD] deployment would hold for the overall strategic 
environment and our arms control objectives” (Coyle 2008a, 4). Then, the Bush administration 
marked itself in the rupture with his predecessors for two reasons: first, the Bush administration 
did not establish a list of criteria; second, the US system did not meet any of these previous 
criteria.  Since  2001,  “the  Missile  Defense  Agency  has  had  26  successful  missile  intercepts. 
Fifteen of the last 16 flight tests have been successful” (US Congress 2007c, 13). 
However, a report published by the Union of Concerned Scientists argued and highlighted the 
inefficiency of the system proposed by Washington and protected by the MDA. They said that “a 
reasoned look at the technology shows that it is not ready for deployment. The system is still in 
the early stage of research and development. Test conditions remain far from realistic” (Union of 
Concerned Scientists 2008). On a more practical standpoint, Philip Coyle explained that “if Iran 
were  reckless  enough  to  attack  Europe  or  the  United  States,  they  wouldn‟t  launch  just  one 
missile, and if they launched several missiles or used decoys and countermeasures, current US 
missiles defenses would not be effective” (2008a, 10). Countermeasures and decoys remain the 
Achilles heel of the missile defense systems deployed in Alaska, California, and the one offered 
to Europe. 
In  addition,  Rep.  Brad  Sherman  (democrat),  a  strong  opponent  to  the  GMD  in  Europe, 
declared “now the administration wants Congress to spend $4 billion on another ground-based 
system, this time in Europe. […] Not only does the administration want to deploy a system that 
does not work, it is willing to do so at the expense of cooperation with Russia and our NATO 
allies and a host of issues far more important to our nuclear defense” (US Congress 2007c, 5). 
The arguments of the opponents to the missile shield system were first, inefficiency, second, 
expansive
5, third, could have negative consequences on the transatlantic relations, and last, could 
generate a new international arm races between states, but also non-state actors. 
 
 
European Narratives and Perceptions around the Missile Shield 
 
The question of the missile shield divided the EU into two groups: the ones in favor and the 
others against the construction of the GMD. This split represented the famous distinction made by 
former US Secretary of Defense Mr. Rumsfled, between the „Old‟ and „New‟ Europe. The states 
of the „Old‟ Europe – read France and Germany – rejected the missile defense project due to its 
                                                 
5 Concerning the cost of the GMD positioned in Europe, the Bush administration requested “about 
$310 million to begin design, construction, and deployment of a ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) 
element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe” (Hildreth and Ek 2007, 1). According 
to Victoria Samson, the total cost for the European missile defense shield for the period 2009-2013 will be 
$915.2 millions. It includes the interceptor site, midcourse radar, construction, planning & design, and the 
interceptor  missiles (Samson 2008b). For the  FY-2009, the President requested $12.4 billion for DoD 
spending on missile defense. The MDA counts $9.4 billion in total. If support of the Congress, by the end 
of 2013, over $110 billion will have been spent since 2003 (Coyle 2008a, 20). When we add up everything, 
in 2013, expected date of accomplishment of the European GMD, the total cost should be around $4.04 
billion. 9 
 
symbol of American unilateralism; while the „New‟ Europe was seeking for US protection and 
bandwagon with it. 
 
The German opposition 
 
When Angela Merkel took office as the German Chancellor in November 2005, she declared that, 
“Germany must attempt to hold the international community together, also especially to hold 
Europe together” (Spiegel Staff 2007a, 5). This statement underlined the need to re-unite the EU 
following the 2003 Iraq crisis. On the issue of the missile defense system, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel was very much concerned about the EU unity politically, as she worried about the 
consequences caused by the US defense system. She claimed that “Europe is weakened in its 
strength and ability to assert its position when it is not united” (Reuters 2007b, 1). On the side of 
EU unity, the question of US missile defense had been at the heart the domestic political debate 
between  Merkel‟s  Christian  Democrats and the center-left  Social  Democrats (Reuters  2007b; 
Spiegel Staff 2007a, 3). Not only it touched on the question of national security, but also on the 
German strategy vis-à-vis the US. 
Likewise, Merkel‟s Social Democrat predecessor Gerhard Schröder was opposed to the US 
missile  shield.  He  considered  it  as  politically  hazardous  and  dangerous  for  the  cohesion  of 
NATO.  “The  security  experts  also  argued  „the  German  government  position‟  should  place 
priority  on  securing  what  had  already  been  achieved  via  arms  control  measures  –  including 
„alliance  cohesion‟  –  before  missile  defense”  (Beste,  von  Hammerstein,  von  Ilsemann,  and 
Mascolo 2007, 3). The current government of Merkel believed in the necessity to discuss the 
question of the missile defense system multilaterally during NATO summits. Merkel warned and 
was concerned about a possible split in Europe as a consequence of bilateral agreements between 
the US and individual EU and NATO Member States (Spiegel Staff 2007b). 
Furthermore,  two  German  political  figures  expressed  their  concerns  around  the  missile 
defense  system.  “German  Foreign  Minister  Frank-Walter  Steinmeier  faulted  the  Bush 
Administration for failing to adequately discuss the proposal with affected countries” (Hildreth 
and Ek 2007, 7). And, Kurt Beck, the chairman of the SPD opposed the planned defense system 
for the reason that “we [Europeans] don‟t need any new missiles in Europe,” and any new arms 
race on the European soil (Spiegel Staff 2007b). Kurt Beck expressed the real apprehension in 
Europe: would it create a new arm race in which Europe would be the field of competition 
between  the  US  and  Russia?  Thus,  concerning  this  military  race,  would  Europe  be  able  to 
compete? And did Europe want to run such race? And finally, could this race destabilize the 
fragile unity of the EU? 
If we take a look and analyze German newspapers at the time, one could realize the existence 
of disagreements, debates and fears around the issue of the GMD. For example, German center-
left newspaper Suddeutsche Zeitung wrote, “in the end it‟s not a missile defense system that will 
offer protection, but rather – as abstract as it sounds – unity, for example on the use of sanctions” 
(Spiegel Staff 2007b, 2).
6 The left-leaning newspaper Die Tageszeitung noted that, “it would be 
wonderful if the US were to decide to abandon the system. But they are not going to do so – and 
why would they? They have wanted one for decades, and they now have the opportunity to fulfill 
this wish within a „coalition of the willing‟ and without having to bother with NATO and the EU” 
(Spiegel Staff 2007b, 2).
7 Another left-leaning newspaper, Berliner Zeitung, published that “the 
SPD leader (Kurt Beck) is not a cabinet member and so can say quite simply: We don‟t need or 
                                                 
6 The Suddeutsche Zeitung also published that “The best of all solutions would be if the system wasn‟t 
even needed – if the US, Russia, and the Europeans were to follow a strict Iran policy, which tightened the 
sanctions screw slowly but surely, and if Tehran were to give up its nuclear program in the face of a 
mutually agreed missile defense program” (Spiegel Staff 2007b, 2). 
7 The Die Tageszeitung also wrote that “The German Chancellor is right in wanting to get the issue 
away from bilateralism and to put it under NATO‟s control. It is only possible to push for the inclusion of 
Russia in the plans within the alliance. That is a peace policy” (Spiegel Staff 2007b, 2). 10 
 
want new missiles in Europe. Most Germans think the same way, especially when the missiles are 
American. Now Chancellor will have to constantly answer the same simple question: Do we 
need, and does she want, new missiles in Europe? But she can not give a simple answer, because 
she  has  to  consider  treaties  and  commitments  to  the  alliance”  (Spiegel  Staff  2007b,  3). 
Interestingly,  even  policy  advisers  from  the  German  Institute  for  International  and  Security 
Affairs and other German think tanks were opposed to the defense project and warned of possible 
disruption of the current European and international balance of power. 
The voice of Germany within the EU has been increasingly  important, constructive, and 
followed. German economy within the Eurozone is one of the strongest, which gives a huge 
credibility  and  recognition  to  Merkel  government.  In  addition,  Chancellor  Merkel  has  been 
working on the unification of the EU at every level: economic, political, and to a lesser extent 
military.  Her  works  paid  off,  when  on  May  1
st,  2008,  Chancellor  Merkel  received  the 
Charlemagne Award for European Unity, which is considered as one of the most prestigious 
European prizes. Germany truly believes in multilateral solutions and the use of diplomacy and 
the rules of law. Germany has been pushing the EU towards this direction. 
 
The obscure position of France 
 
The  case  of  France  is  quite  different  from  Germany,  especially  since  the  arrival  of  Nicolas 
Sarkozy at the French Presidency in May 2007. President Sarkozy was in total rupture with 
former President, Mr. Chirac, especially in trying to reestablish stronger ties with Washington. 
Former  President  Chirac  was  a  symbol  of  anti-American  unilateralism,  which  attained  its 
paramount in March 2003 prior the beginning of the war in Iraq. Since 2003, Mr. Chirac was 
opposed to most of American foreign policy initiatives, and on the case of the missile shield, 
“former French President Chirac cautioned against the creation of „new divisions in Europe‟” 
(Hildreth and Ek 2007, 7). Chirac wanted to keep to some extent harmony within the EU, which 
was already weak since the rejection of the Constitution in 2005. But, with President Sarkozy, 
one could argue that a real shift had occurred as he was working on harmonizing diplomatic 
relations with Washington. This harmonization started with a rapprochement on different levels: 
individual,  between  Sarkozy  and  Bush,  and  international.  Internationally,  Mr.  Sarkozy,  for 
example,  increased  the  number  of  troops  in  Afghanistan  and  backed  up  more  policies 
implemented  by  the  Bush  administration.  In  addition,  Sarkozy  was  working  on  reintegrating 
France  as  a  full  time  member  of  NATO,  which  took  place  in  2009.  As  proved  by  Mcardle 
Kelleher, “Russia has had less success with Nicolas Sarkozy than with Jacques Chirac. Sarkozy‟s 
first visit to Moscow gave far more approval to the general concept of missile defense and the 
position of the United States. Popular sentiment is divided although there is surprising sympathy 
for a multilateral European solution” (Mcardle Kelleher 2007, 12). 
In the case of the construction of the missile shield, it  was unclear where France stood. 
Discussions between politicians and political advisers were very marginal. And as explained by 
Krzysztof Soloch, analyst at the French Institute of International Relations, the real debate around 
the missile shield was to define if this American program was multilateral, global or bilateral. 
Under Chirac, such program was considered as being bilateral, but under Sarkozy, it had been 
considered as a multilateral global project in the sense that it could be used for the protection of 
Europe (Rosenzweig 2008). France under Chirac was representing a rupture in the transatlantic 
dialogue, whereas Sarkozy has tried to close the gap between France and the US.  
To summarize, French position on the missile shield has been very complex and unclear. 
There is no total agreement or disagreement. It seemed that the topic had been avoided since the 
arrival of Sarkozy at the Elyssée. Hence, French media mainly focused on the Russian-American 
dialogue/tension over the missile shield without mentioning the French position. It could also be 
argued that France was seeking for possible solutions multilaterally during NATO meetings. 
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The positions of Poland and Czech Republic  
 
The  positions  of  Poland  and  the  Czech  Republic  were  very  surprising  in  the  fact  that  both 
countries would host part of the GMD, but  were also facing divisions domestically over the 
approval of the project. 
In the case of Poland, polls indicated that a majority of Poles disapproved the idea of hosting 
a part of the missile defense. “Most objections were based upon concerns over sovereignty, as 
well  as  over  the  belief  that  the  presence  of  the  system  would  diminish  rather  than  increase 
national security and might harm relations with neighboring states” (Hildreth and Ek 2007, 5). In 
addition, Poland was asking for guarantee of US protection against eventual attacks orchestrated 
by  rogue  states  and/or  Russia.  Poland  had  been  “requesting  that  the  United  States  provide 
batteries of Patriot missiles to shield Poland against short- and medium-range missiles” (Hildreth 
and Ek 2007, 5). 
Politically speaking, Polish politicians saw the GMD as a way to be respected regionally and 
internationally, but also fully integrated within the Euro-Atlantic community. Concerning the 
GMD, “German calls for negotiation are also seen as just one more German unwillingness to treat 
Poland as a full member of Europe, able to determined to defend its own national interest, and 
unwilling to follow any German aspirations to superiority” (Mcardle Kelleher 2007, 12). The 
historical tensions between Germany and Poland were probably underestimated by politicians. 
In the case of Czech Republic, the government believed that the decision to host the radar 
was too important to leave the decision to the people, knowing that 70% of Czechs would reject 
such construction, and that national opposition was considerably growing (Coyle 2008b). Even 
against popular opposition, Czech government officials supported the US plan and believed that it 
was in their interests to carry on a project that would increase their national security. However, in 
the  worst-case  scenario,  officials  believed  that  even  if  the  system  did  not  work,  the  cost  of 
construction and US investments would help strengthening Czech economy and security. For 
example, the US planned to spend $1 billion in Czech Republic, and the construction of such 
radar would benefit local firms and bring them around $90m  (Coyle 2008b). 
From  a  military  standpoint,  according  Czech  officials,  the  GMD  would  offer  the  Czech 
Republic a protection from Russia. But, an undesired outcome was that it could attract attention 
from  Iran  or  other  states  pushing  them  to  destroy  the  radar  affecting  the  security  of  Czech 
Republic. The Czech Republic was playing a dangerous game that could be costly at the domestic 
and regional level. 
Both countries were looking for moving under the umbrella of the world superpower by 
hosting a piece of the missile shield. But, was the outcome of such gamble worth it in the long 
term? Was such decision made by Poland and Czech Republic an illustration of the failure of 
European enlargement and the process of integration? Was it also an illustration of the lack of 
projection of hard power from the EU? 
 
The lack of a unified EU voice  
 
Were the decisions made by Poland and Czech Republic a representation of a lack of cohesion in 
shaping  a  common  EU  foreign  and security  policy?  On  one  side,  the  Common  Foreign  and 
Security Policy (CFSP) belong to the second pillar of the European institutional system, meaning 
that the decision-making remains intergovernmental. There has not been an unified EU foreign 
policy. The second side is that EU Member States were – are still – not willing to pool their 
capabilities  together  as  it  is  perceived  as  loss  of  national  sovereignty  and  too  some  extent 
weakening of national security. States like France, Britain, and Italy are still strongly attached to 
their national sovereignty and autonomy, and rarely talk of pooling their defense together unless 
it fits with their interests. 
Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier argued in his article that the EU is a conglomerate of twenty-
seven sovereign states having divergent political projects and that their cohesion is in fact based 12 
 
on the American leadership. He added that European protection remains under an American-
occidental  agreement  and  that  the  EU  follows  this  path  because  it  is  satisfying  for  both 
governments and public opinion. This pact had been made in order to protect the European model 
of Welfare states, and its economy (Mongrenier 2007, 4). However, such comments do not take 
into consideration the fact that the EU is not only working on its own defense program, but also 
that the original European project was not designed to become a military union, but instead to 
enforce peace between Member States in Europe through deep economic integration. The EU has 
certainly been able to grow under NATO/US umbrella throughout the Cold War, but it did not 
mean that the EU had to agree with and back up any military moves made by Washington – 
especially when the outcome could destabilize the European balance of power. Furthermore, the 
US position towards the EU on the question of defense and security has been quite paradoxical, 
as it had pushed Europeans for years to increase their contributions to their own security and the 
security of the region such as the Balkans. Following the Treaty of Saint Malo in December 1998, 
which established the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the Americans raised their 
concerns about such European project. During the early years of the Bush administration, the US 
expressed considerable skepticism concerning the ESDP and the consequences it could have on 
the survival of NATO. 
In April 2008, while being interviewed, Javier Solana, the High Representative of the CFSP, 
acknowledged “so far, the missile defense issue has not been discussed in the EU framework” 
because it is a matter of national responsibility (Solana 2008). In a statement made by French 
senator, Yves Pozzo di Borgo, at the French Sénat, concerning the US missile shield, the author 
explained that the EU had always been kept on the side, and that the US had been interacting 
bilaterally with Poland and Czech Republic. The senator also criticized the fact that German 
Foreign  minister,  Frank-Walter  Steinmeier,  wanted  to  raise  the  issue  within  NATO,  but  not 
within the institutional framework of the EU. Only Solana had tried to insist on the necessity to 
bring the issue between EU Member States within an European forum. Very rarely, the question 
of US missile shield in Europe had been brought during meeting of the Council of Minister or 
even the Commission (Pozzo di Borgo 2007, 39). During another interview, Solana confirmed 
that “the European Union is not directly involved in the issue of missile defense. […] Agreement 
on how to proceed would indeed be very positive for European security” (Golovanova 2007, 2). 
So there was a real lack of EU harmony simply because EU Member States blocked the process. 
 
The tensions caused by Russia 
 
The GMD plan had also affected the relationship between the US and Russia, but also the balance 
of power in Europe. Putin affirmed that it would reignite the arms race, but the US rejected 
Russian criticism. However, the US guaranteed that the interceptors “could not possibly act as a 
deterrent against Russia” (Hildreth and Ek 2007), because there are only designed to protect 
Europe and the US from an Iranian attack. 
During the security conference in Munich in February 2007, Putin threatened to abrogate the 
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and would not follow the obligations of the 
Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe. If GMD construction were to be built, Russia warned to 
“target Poland and Czech Republic and place medium-range missiles in Kaliningrad; suspend 
participation in the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, potentially restarting the Cold War; 
announce the successful development of new ICBMs and new maneuvering RVs; put its strategic 
bombers back on training flights; and threaten to pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces treaty” (Coyle 2008b, 2). In the same conference in Munich, President Putin on the topic 
of missile defense system accused the US of pursuing world domination and warned against a 
militarization of space. 
During the annual address to the Federal Assembly, Putin declared on the question of the US 
missile defense system in Europe that, “our partners [the US] are not displaying correct behavior, 
to say the least, in their attempts to gain unilateral advantages.” He added “while making use of 13 
 
an invented pretext for not ratifying the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, they are taking 
advantage of the situation to build up their own system of military bases along our borders” 
(President of Russia 2007, 13). Even if Russia had been aware of this project for several years, it 
feared that “the modest GMD facilities planned for Eastern Europe are likely just the harbinger of 
a more ambitious program” (Hildreth and Ek 2007, 9). According to Goldman, Russia had six 
objections  against  the  deployment  of  a  ground-based  midcourse  missile  defense  system  in 
Europe:  
 
“a)  the  proposed  GMD,  situated  close  to  Russia‟s  borders,  poses  a  threat  to 
Russia‟s strategic nuclear deterrent retaliatory capability and is really directed 
against Russia, not against some non-existent Iranian or North Korean threat; 
b)Russia was not adequately consulted about the GMD deployment; c) the GMD 
will spur a renewed nuclear arms race; d) the proposed deployments in Poland 
and  the  Czech  Republic  violate  earlier  US/NATO  pledges to  Moscow not  to 
establish  new  military  bases  in  those  countries;  e)  the  missiles  deployed  in 
Poland could have offensive capability to strike targets in Russia; f) the radar in 
the Czech Republic could be used to „spy‟ on Russia” (Goldman 2007, 20). 
 
One of the solutions proposed to the US was to share a military base in Azerbaijan. Putin 
offered  the  US  to  use  a  Russian  radar  station  in  Qabala,  Azerbaijan,  complemented  by 
interceptors in Iraq and Turkey. However, the station of Qabala was built 20 years ago, and the 
facilities needed to be either updated or replaced. The US reply was that “if we [the US] agreed to 
share the radar, we would expand Moscow‟s influence in an anti-Russian region at little military 
benefit to ourselves” (Szrom 2007). 
During a presidential debate between Putin and Bush in April 6, 2008, Putin declared: “I will 
not hide the fact that missile defense in Europe was and still is one the most difficult problems. 
This is not a matter of language, of diplomatic wording, but a problem of substance” (President of 
Russia 2008, 1). During the Q&A about the missile defense site in Europe, considering a possible 
agreement on the issue, Putin answered: “I am cautiously optimistic about our ability to reach a 
final agreement. […] But the devil, as is so often the case, is in the detail” (President of Russia 
2008, 4). In the same time, he called for the creation of a „global missile defense system‟ in which 
the US and Russia would collaborate. 
 
 
Final Remarks 
 
To conclude this paper, four points need to be addressed. First, the US actions around the case of 
the  missile  shield  in  Europe  were  a  representation  of  the  Bush  era  and  the  foreign  policy 
emerging  from  it.  American  unilateralism  was  perceived  by  Washington  as  the  appropriate 
strategy as long as it increased US national security at the expenses of cooperation with allies. 
Interestingly enough, during a series of hearings at the US Congress in 2007, US senators never 
mentioned or even took into consideration the divisions created among EU Member States around 
the question of missile shield. US national interests were simply at the heart of discussions. In a 
majority of hearings, it was apparent that the US was simply thinking on unilateral terms. Talks 
were always about the Czech Republic and Poland as recipients, but never about Brussels and/or 
other EU Member States. The missile shield exemplified the notion of American exceptionalism 
very present during the Bush era. 
The second point is that this issue of missile defense system was much more than a military 
and security issue, it was perceived as the way the US interacted with the EU and respects its 
allies. But, most significantly, it seemed that the understanding of international relations was 
diverging on both sides of the pond. The EU has historically perceived international relations and 
international  security  based  on  cooperation,  multilateralism  –  effective  multilateralism  –, 14 
 
diplomacy and so on as it was addressed in the 2003 European Security Strategy; whereas the US 
has been following a different path with a foreign policy based on unilateralism and hard power. 
This could undeniably illustrate the famous expression of the Venus versus Mars. Furthermore, 
the concept of the „coalition of the willing‟ had already damaged the way the EU perceived the 
US and divided Europeans, but also considerably changed European perceptions of the US and 
the transatlantic dynamics.  
The third point that needs to be raised is about the future of the EU CFSP. Can the EU unify 
its foreign and security policy? and ultimately be in charged of its military destiny? With the 
widening of the EU, many new Member States have been extremely dependent on and to some 
extent  bandwagoning  with  the  EU  powerhouses.  Poland  and  the  Czech  Republic  were  no 
exception to the rule unless that they chose to bandwagon with the US rather than the EU. Back 
then, the US was perceived as a better option guaranteeing their security. The EU membership 
was more of a symbol of economic stability and prospective growth rather than military security. 
NATO and the US were and are still perceived as the real security provider. 
The last point reflects on the fact that the missile shield system should have been instead 
placed  under  NATO  auspices.  By  acting  unilaterally,  the  US  was  indirectly  or  consciously 
disrupting the fragile unity of the EU over the contentious question of defense and security. This 
specific sector of the EU is already a problem by itself, so if a third party were to interfere it may 
slow down the deepening process of the institutional evolution of the second pillar in the long 
term. The lesson of this chapter is simple: the EU needs to find a way to solve its problems 
through the use of a single voice. This has been a real challenge considering the centrality of 
nation-states and the limited power of the High Representative. However it appears that even 
today after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the External European Action 
Service, the EU would have been in a similar situation, no unity and national responses. 
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